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I. INTRODUCTION
Many states, including West Virginia, have struggled to develop
a rational scheme for making child custody decisions which are
fundamentally fair.1 Historically, West Virginia, like many other
states,2 utilized the "best interest of the child" doctrine.3 However,
in 1981, West Virginia adopted the "primary caretaker" doctrine
in Garska v. McCoy. 4
1. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, Micu. L.
REv. 477 (1984); See, e.g., Podell, Peck, & First, Custody-to Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. Rnv.
51 (1973); Comment, Child Custody Laws: Custody Presumptions Favoring One Parent May Impair
the Child's Best Interests, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 187 (1986); Comment, Male Parent v. Female Parent:
Separate and Unequal Rights, 43 UMKC L. REv. 392 (1975).
2. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE
L. & PoL'Y REv. 267 (1987); Lomment, Best Interests Revisited: In Search of Guidelines, 1987 UTAH
L. REv. 651 (1987); Morris, The Best Interests of the Child, U. Cm. L. Rav, 447 (1984); Comment,
The Best Interests of the Child-Custody and Visitation in Pennsylvania, 26 DUQ. L. R~v. 89 (1987);
Digest, Child Custody: Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 7 J. Juv. L. 135 (1983); Note,
Turner v. Turner: A Return to the Best Interest of the Child Standard in Child Custody Cases, 31
Loy. L. REv. 375 (1985); "Best Interest" and "Material Change" Factors in Child Custody and
Visitation Modification Suits, 46 TEx. BAR J. 1228 (1983); Comment, The Changing Family and the
Child's Best Interests: Current Standards Discriminate Against Single Working Mothers In California
Custody Modification Cases, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 759 (1986); Comment, The Best Interest of
the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin Custody Cases, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 343 (1980).
3. See discussion in Section II infra. This doctrine had its origin in the English law courts'
repudiation of the common law rule that a man's children were his property and thus, after a divorce,
he had an absolute right to their possession. See Bennett v. Alcott, 100 Eng. Rep. 90 (1787); Jones
v. Brown, 170 Eng. Rep. 165 (1795); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, ComiNTAnRms 453. The first breach in the
wall came in Blisset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (1773) where Lord Mansfield held that, "if the father
is a bankrupt, if he contributed nothing for the child or family, and if he be improper .... the
Court will not think it right that the child should be with him." Id. This ruling was not expanded
upon until the celebrated case of Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817), in which the poet,
Percy Blythe Shelley, sought custody of his two minor children after his wife had taken her own life.
The Court refused to apply the paternal preference rule due to his "irreligious and immoral principles,"
and awarded custody to the maternal grandparents, See also NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENOLISH LIT-
ERATuRE 504-06 (M. Abrams 3d ed. 1974). This led, ultimately to Justice Talfourd's Act, 1839, 2
and 3 Vict., c. 54, which provided that Chancery Courts could award custody of children under the
age of seven to the mother.
4. 167 W. Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
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This article will examine the history of child custody law in
West Virginia and other states, examine the basis for the primary
caretaker doctrine and discuss the experience of West Virginia and
other states with that doctrine. Finally, the article will suggest a
rational scheme for the primary caretaker doctrine and its excep-
tions in West Virginia.5
II. CHILD CUSTODY IN WEST VIRGINIA BEFORE GARSKA
In 1901, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had oc-
casion to address, for the first time,6 issues of child custody and
domestic relations law which it would revisit often in the succeeding
years. In Cariens v. Cariens," the husband, a locomotive engineer
became disenchanted with his wife because "she was bearing him
children too rapidly." ' 8 Obtaining the assistance of a lawyer, he
had a separation agreement drawn up which he presented to her.
In it, he released all claims for custody of their child if she would
release him from all obligations for alimony and child support. He
threatened that, if she did not sign it, he would "take from her
the child already born and the one of which she was then pregnant
when it should be born, and all the furniture in the house that he
had furnished." 9 Unwillingly, she yielded to this compulsion and
signed the document.
The couple separated and, when they failed to reconcile, the
wife filed her bill of divorcement and proved it in every particular.
The husband petitioned for divorce, custody, and no alimony,
charging adultery. He offered no proof. The circuit court, however,
granted his petition giving him custody of the newborn male child
5. In a recent opinion, Justice Richard Neely, the author of Garska, notes "that our very
narrow exception to the primary caretaker rule has of late developed a voracious appetite which, if
left unchecked, will allow it to eat the rule." David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (xV.
Va. 1989) (emphasis in original).
6. In an earlier case, the court briefly addressed the issue of a father seeking custody who
had previously relinquished custody to a third party. The court held that to gain custody, he must
show that it would materially benefit the child to have custody returned to him. Cunningham v.
Barnes, 37 W. Va. 746, 17 S.E. 308 (1893).
7. 50 W. Va. 113, 40 S.E. 335 (1901).
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and giving her custody of the young female child. The court dis-
charged him from paying any alimony.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, granting
custody of both children to the mother. Stating that the father had
never visited the children since the separation and that they had
been cared for exclusively by their mother, the court reversed the
common law rule, which held that the father had legal ownership
of the children and was entitled to possession of them in the event
of divorce. 10 Specifically, the court found that:
The law as to the custody of children has been greatly modified. Formerly, the
right of the father to its custody was almost an inflexible rule. That rule forgot
that a mother had a heart. The real owner of the child, be it even a baby, must
give it up. But civilization, advanced thought, and human kindness have bent
this iron rule and opened the ears of the courts to the pleading of the true
friend and owner of the child. The courts do not, these days inexorably take
from mothers their children of tender years, even for the father, if the mother
is a fit person and has a home for them, but look at all the circumstances. The
welfare of the child is the test. The welfare of a tender child is with the mother
generally."
Thus in its first child custody decision, the court decided that,
for children of tender years, the trial judge -must look at all the
circumstances and consider the welfare of the child as a primary
goal. Mothers, if they were fit and could provide a home, would
generally be given custody of such children.
The court next dealt with child custody law in 1905 in the case
of Dawson v. Dawson.12 The court determined that earlier decisions
on custody between the same parties were res judicata in a sub-
sequent proceeding to change custody. The new proceeding could
only be based on events occurring since the earlier proceedings, 3
and a change should only be made "for the benefit of the chil-
dren."14
10. Id. at 118, S.E.2d at 337-38.
11. Id. at 118, 140 S.E. at 337.
12. 57 W. Va. 520, 50 S.E. 613 (1905).
13. This, of course, presages the development of the "material change of circumstances" test
to justify a modification of custody petition.
14. Dawson, 157 W. Va. at 553, 50 S.E. at 619.
[Vol. 92
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In Dawson, the court also addressed a father's common law
demand for possession of his children after the trial court granted
custody to his wife. After citing Cariens with approval, the court
adopted the following reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court:
15
Ordinarily the father is entitled to the care and custody of his infant child, but
when the father is claiming the custody of the child the Court will exercise its
discretion according to the facts and what appears to be the best interest of
the child. The welfare of the child is the controlling consideration.
16
In Dawson, for the first time, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals enunciated the doctrine that, in matters of custody, the
guiding principle would be "the best interest of the child.'
17
In 1919, the court had a more difficult case to decide. Buseman
v. Buseman"8 arose when the wife abandoned the marital home in
Morgantown and moved with her infant daughter to Cleveland,
Ohio. There she placed the child in the Jones Home for Friendless
Children, and later filed there for divorce. Still later she agreed to
dismiss that suit and place the child, with her husband's written
consent, with an unrelated Morgantown couple to raise as their
own. 19 The husband then sued for divorce which was granted. In
the divorce decree, the trial court, over the husband's objection,
granted the mother's request that the child remain in the custody
of the third-party couple who had been caring for her.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the cus-
tody order as being in the best interest of the child. The court
stated that both parents had agreed in writing to give custody to
the third party. Nothing had changed since then which, in the court's
opinion, would justify a change of custody. While affirming the
priority rights to custody of fit natural parents, the court held that
the relinquishment of that right to a fit third party was valid and
binding.20
15. Meyers v. Meyers, 100 Va. 228, 40 S.E. 1038 (1902).
16. Dawson, 57 W. Va. at 533, 50 S.E. at 619.
17. Id.
18. 83 W. Va. 496, 98 S.E. 574 (1919).
19. Id. at 498, S.E. at 575.
20. Id. at 502-03, 98 S.E. at 576.
1990]
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In the succeeding decade, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals began to modernize the law of child custody. In Gates v.
Gates,21 the trial court awarded custody of the three children to
their father and prohibited the wife from remarrying for five years.
The father had physical custody of the two older children while
the mother continued to care for the infant daughter. The father
filed a habeas corpus petition to recover the third child and the
constable executed on it and gave him the child without a court
hearing. The mother later petitioned the court and received a mod-
ification allowing her to remarry and to regain custody of the third
child. The father appealed, but the court held that the circum-
stances of her remarriage constituted a sufficient change of cir-
cumstances to modify the prior decree, particularly since there had
been no hearing or adjudication of the father's habeas corpus pe-
tition.22
In Norman v. Norman,23 the court was faced with the issue of
whether a woman who had abandoned the marital home could be
given custody of a child. The wife put on evidence of domestic
violence which shocked the court even in 1921 .24 The court held
that the husband's cruel and inhumane treatment caused her aban-
donment, and upheld the award of custody to her. 25
In Boos v. Boos,2 6 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held for the first time that the rights of the mother and father to
the custody of their children in a divorce action was equal. Further,
in upholding a custody award to the mother, the court clearly enun-
ciated the standard that the welfare of the child was the controlling
21. 87 W. Va. 603, 105 S.E. 815 (1921).
22. Id. at 607, 105 S.E. at 816.
23. 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S.E. 407 (1921).
24. The evidence was as follows: Plaintiff's two hundred pound husband came home very late.
His ninety-eight pound wife asked him to watch their sick child so she could go milk the cow. In
a rage he assaulted and abused her. On another occasion, he lifted her by the throat and choked
her into unconsciousness, then kicked her, breaking several ribs. While she was recuperating, he forced
her to have intercourse. When she recovered, she left and sued for divorce on grounds of cruelty.
Her petition was granted. Id. at 643-45, 107 S.E. at 409.
25. The court continued to recognize the paternal preference from the common law, but also
recognized the judicial discretion of the trial court to ignore it. Id. at 648-49, 107 S.E. at 411.
26. 93 W. Va. 727, 117 S.E. 616 (1923).
[Vol. 92
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consideration. Finally, the court held that the father's refusal to
contribute money to support the child was a factor to be considered
in determining who had been looking out for the child's best in-
terest. 27 Next, the court reversed and remanded a case in which the
trial court took a five year old child from the mother who had
been caring for her and awarded custody to the father without
making any findings regarding the child's best interest. 28
Again in Odlasek v. Odlasek,29 the court held that when parents
consent in writing to relinquish their child's custody to a third-
party, in this case the child's paternal grandparents, they cannot
regain that custody without a showing that it would materially pro-
mote the child's welfare.30 The court also took notice of the four-
teen year old child's intelligence and her stated preference to live
with her grandmother rather than her parents.3
But, when there has been no written relinquishment, and the
custodial father had regularly paid the maternal grandmother to
care for his eleven-year old son, he is entitled to regain custody,
even against the intelligently stated wishes of the son.
32
In the last case of the 1930's the court held that, as a matter
of law and policy, in divorce actions involving children of tender
years, the mother would be given preference for custody where both
parents are equally fit.3 This was required by the "best interest
of the child" analysis announced in Norman v. Norman.
34
Thus, as the Roaring Twenties drew to a close, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals came full circle from Gates v.
Gates.35 Gates, in 1921, recognized a paternal preference but al-
27. Id. at 735-36, 117 S.E. at 619.
28. Post v. Post, 95 W. Va. 155, 120 S.E. 385 (1923). The court also reaffirmed the equal
right of each parent to seek custody. Id.
29. 98 W. Va. 357, 127 S.E. 59 (1925).
30. Id. at 361, 127 S.E. at 60. See also State v. Bonar, 75 W. Va. 332, 83 S.E. 991 (1914);
Fletcher v. Hickman, 50 W. Va. 244, 40 S.E. 371 (1901); Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14
S,E. 212 (1891).
31. Odalsek, 98 W. Va. at 360, 127 S.E. 60.
32. State ex rel. Palmer v. Postlethwaite, 106 W. Va. 838, 145 S.E. 738 (1928).
33. Beaumont v. Beaumont, 106 W. Va. 622, 146 S.E. 618 (1929).
34. 88 W. Va. at 648-49, 107 S.E. at 411.
35. 87 W. Va. 603, 105 S.E. at 815 (1921).
1990]
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lowed a mother to show sufficient circumstances to justify a mod-
ification of custody. In 1929, the Beaumont Court recognized a
maternal preference, shifting the burden to the father to rebut it
by showing circumstances pertaining to the child's best interest.
This would mark the parameters of custody battles for more than
five decades, until the court's 1981 decision in Garska.36
The 1930's saw a further consolidation of the mother's pref-
erence in custody disputes, until the final case of the decade when
the fitness issue began to be litigated in earnest.
The first case of the 1930's, Reynolds v. Reynolds,37 further
defined the maternal preference for custody of children of tender
years. The court held that taking such a child from its mother's
custody could only be justified "where the most cogent reasons
exist." ' 38 The court was very tolerant of any behavioral lapses by
the mother,
recognizing that in a normal mother, such as we believe this one to be, the
deepseated impulse to care properly for her young child is the controlling thought
of her life, the mantle of charity should be thrown around her to the end that
mistakes may be forgotten and the good may be emphasized. Since none are
without fault, charity should prevail. 9
The court went on in Arnold v. Arnold0 to hold that a mother
who was granted a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman
treatment by her husband was, almost as a matter of law, entitled
to custody of her children. 41 This was taken further in the Suder
v. Suder42 case where the court stated that even a fit father should
not be given consideration as a custodial parent if he presents the
36. Later in 1929, the court announced that, all things being equal, the "innocent spouse" in
a divorce would be given first consideration as custodian. Rierson v. Rierson, 107 W. Va. 321, 148
S. E. 203, 204 (1929).
37. 109 W. Va. 513, 155 S.E. 652 (1930).
38. Id. at 514, 155 S.E. at 653.
39. Id. at 514-15, 155 S.E. at 653.
40. 112 W. Va. 481, 164 S.E. 850 (1932).
41. The court stated that "[s]uch idiosyncrasy does not distinguish him as a desirable person
to assume the responsibility of properly nurturing a small boy and rearing him to manhood under
a guidance that would impart to him a fit conception of ordinary proprieties of life." Id. at 485,
164 S.E. at 852.
42. 112 W. Va. 664, 166 S.E. 385 (1932).
[Vol. 92
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trial court with no definite plans for how he would care for the
children. 43
Only in the decade's last cases do we notice, for the first time,
the issue of the mother's fitness to be the custodial parent being
seriously litigated.44 In the case of Settle v. Settle,45 we see the
outlines of the battle that would preoccupy domestic relations courts
in our state until Garska. Having established that a mother will
be given preference for custody if she is fit, it was inevitable that
the struggle would shift to this court-defined battleground.
In Settle, the wife sued for divorce on the grounds of cruelty
and the husband answered, denying cruelty and praying for custody
on the grounds of the wife's "intimate contact ' 46 with another
man. The circuit judge found that she had not proved cruelty and
that her husband had not proved that she carried on intimate re-
lations with another man. The judge denied her divorce and awarded
her custody of the children with limited visitation to the father
under a separate maintenance decree.47
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the lower
court was correct in finding no cruelty on his part, but incorrect
in finding her behavior proper. Since her actions with another man
were "inconsistent with circumspection and matronly propriety,"4
the court held, in effect, that the maternal preference would not
apply. Since both parents had presented evidence showing they were
able to provide good homes for their children, the court ordered
custody to be shared by them. The mother was given custody of
the children from September through May (their school year), while
the father received custody for June, July and August (their sum-
mer vacation). 49
43. Id. at 665, 166 S.E. at 385.
44. Straughan v. Straughan, 115 W. Va. 639, 177 S.E. 771 (1934) (where a husband was proved
guilty of adultery and the wife proved innocent, she should get custody under a Rierson analysis).
45. 117 W. Va. 476, 185 S.E. 859 (1936).
46. Id. at 477, 185 S.E. at 860.
47. Id. at 483, 185 S.E. at 862-63.
48. Id. at 478, 185 S.E. at 860.
49. The court expressed a preference for giving each parent six months of custody per year
but the practical consideration of the children's schooling prevented such a division. On balance, the
mother was given the longer custody period because of the young age of the children. Id. at 482-
83, 185 S.E. at 862.
1990]
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Thus, the decade ended with the first court-ordered joint cus-
tody decision, a standard for judging fitness, and a way to rebut
the maternal preference. All these matters would be tested further
in the years to come.
The court did not have occasion to visit this issue again until
1949.50 In the Pugh v. Pugh case, 51 the court was faced with re-
versing a trial court judge who had apparently taken the court at
its word in Settle v. Settle.5 2 In Pugh, a returning soldier had gone
off and, without objection from his wife, obtained a Nevada di-
vorce. That decree, naturally, did not address the issue of custody
for their infant son. The mother moved to California and resided
there for several years with her son. The father appeared one day,
snatched the child and returned with him to West Virginia. The
mother brought a writ of habeas corpus for the return of the child.
The trial court, finding both parents equally bad, split custody of
the four-year old boy between them every six months under the
supervision of the Department of Public Assistance. The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding that this bi-
coastal, semi-annual disruption of the child's life was manifestly
not in his best interest and that the mother had failed to meet her
burden of showing that a change of the child's current custody
would be in his best interest. Therefore, custody remained with the
father.53
The 1950's saw a further development of the fitness issue, with
the court continuing to resolve difficult custody issues by examining
the character of the parents.5 4
50. In 1946, the court ruled that a child custody hearing held without proper notice to the
other party denied due process and was void. Harloe v. Harloe, 129 W. Va. 1, 38 S.E.2d 362 (1946),
In 1947, the court refused to return a child from the paternal grandparents to the mother while the
custodial father was serving overseas in the armed forces. Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va. 765, 425
S.E.2d 11 (1947). Similarly, in 1948, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that a custodial parent
who voluntarily relinquishes that custody must demonstrate that it would materially benefit the child
to regain custody. State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d 221 (1948).
51. 133 W. Va. 501, 56 S.E.2d 901 (1949).
52. 117 W. Va. 476, 185 S.E. at 859 (1936).
53. Pugh, 133 W. Va. at 507-10, 56 S.E.2d 904-906.
54. There were also two technical procedural decisions. State ex rel. Warren v. Roberts, 144
W. Va. 741, 110 S.E.2d 909 (1959), held that an oral motion did not constitute a petition to modify
[Vol. 92
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In Finnegan v. Finnegan," the court held that a wife who ob-
tains a divorce based on cruelty was generally entitled to custody
as the innocent spouse.5 6 The court went on, however, in language
that presaged the later reasoning in Garska, to urge the trial courts
to consider which parent had devoted "more time and attention
... to the care, the moral training, and the education of the
child." 57 The court went on to emphasize that the wishes of a
twelve-year old son to remain with his father, while entitled to
consideration, were not controlling on the matter of custody.5 8
In the final two important cases5 9 of the decade, Rohrbaugh v.
Rohrbaugh60 and Witt v. Witt,61 the court more firmly established
the Rierson doctrine that an innocent spouse will generally be
granted custody.
62
The decade of the 1960's turned out to be one in which the
court addressed repeatedly the issue of a parent's right to custody
as against that of a third party.
In Whiteman v. Robinson63 the mother of the children disap-
peared and the father placed the children temporarily with various
relatives until she could be found. The mother's body was later
under the statutory provisions. Springer v. Springer, 144 W. Va. 697, 110 S.E.2d 912 (1959) (a
companion case to Warren) held that an answer and counterclaim filed in response to a rule to show
cause was properly treated as a petition to modify custody under statutory provisions.
55, 134 W. Va. 94, 58 S.E.2d 594 (1950).
56. Id. at 104, 58 S.E.2d at 599.
57. Id. at 105, 58 S.E.2d at 600.
58. Id.
59. In Smith v. Smith, 138 W. Va. 388, 76 S.E.2d 253 (1953), the court affirmed the award
of custody to an "innocent spouse" who had proven cruelty. In Stout v. Massie, 140 W. Va. 731,
88 S.E.2d 51 (1955), the court affirmed an award of custody to the third parties to whom the custodial
mother had relinquished custody. The same ruling formed the basis of State ex rel. Harmon v.
Utterback, 144 W. Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959). Finally, an eighteen-year old minor who had an
illegitimate child and relinquished custody could not regain it for the same reason. Lucy K. v. Brawner,
144 W.Va 690, 110 S.E.2d 739 (1959).
60. 136 W. Va. 708, 68 S.E.2d 361 (1951), overruled, J. B. v. A. B., 161 W. Va. 332, 242
S.E.2d 248 (1978).
61. 141 W. Va. 43, 87 S.E.2d 524 (1955).
62. In Rohrbagh, the husband proved adultery and was granted custody. Rohrbagh, 136 W.
Va. at 719-22, 68 S.E.2d at 369-70. In Witt, the wife proved cruelty and received custody. Witt, 141
W. Va. at 54-55, 87 S.E.2d at 530.
63. 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960). Accord Honaker v. Burnside, No. 19372, slip. op.
(W. Va, Dec. 21, 1989).
1990]
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discovered and, after a year, the husband remarried and sought to
regain custody of his children. The court held that a fit parent has
an absolute right to custody of his children as against third parties
unless he has manifested a clear intent, in writing or otherwise, to
relinquish that custody. Here, the father had not manifested such
an intent, and so regained custody.
6A4
In Holstein v. Holstein,65 the court declared that a mother who
had been granted custody of her children in a divorce decree, but
who subsequently had that custody modified because of her in-
discretions, had to show that it would be in the children's material
best interest for her to regain their custody.
66
And finally, in State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock,67 the court held
that, after a custodial father has died, a fit mother has an absolute
right to custody as against all third parties. 68 Further, the court
found that the express preference of a ten and eleven year old child,
while entitled to due consideration, would not control the result.69
In the last decade before Garska, there was continuing litigation
of custody issues, 70 but only one important case. In J. B. v. A.
B. 71 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals finally came to
grips with the issue that many other high courts had been struggling
with: the constitutionality of the maternal preference.
64. Id. at 695-96, 116 S.E.2d at 696-97.
65. 152 W. Va. 119, 160 S.E.2d 177 (1968). See also, Abstract, Infants-Change of Custody,
71 W. VA. L. REv. 95 (1969).
66. Holstein, 152 W. Va. at 127, 160 S.E.2d at 182.
67. 153 W. Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1969).
68. Id. at 412-13, 168 S.E.2d at 803.
69. Id. at 413, 168 S.E.2d at 803.
70. In Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 211 S.E.2d 118 (1975), the court held that fathers
have absolute custody rights as against maternal grandparents following the death of the custodial
mother. In Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), the maternal preference
was affirmed. In Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W. Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977), the court allowed
the preference of children of non-tender years (eleven and twelve) to support the trial court's award
of custody to the father where parents were equally fit and divorce was granted based on the parties'
two-year separation. In Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W. Va. 45, 239 S.E.2d 669 (1977), the court reaffirmed
the maternal preference in custody matters involving children of tender years, thus setting the stage
for the constitutional challenge in J. B. v. A. B., 161 W. Va. 332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978). Finally,
in McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978) the court held that the trial court's
power in divorce cases was purely statutory and not equitable.
71. 161 W. Va. 332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978).
[Vol. 92
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In this case, the court turned back the constitutional challenge
and set more detailed standards for rebutting the maternal pref-
erence. It held that, since the rights of the parents were subordinate
to the rights of the child, the maternal preference promotes that
legitimate state interest in a rational way. It based that conclusion
on the biology of a suckling child, as well as on various sociological
analyses .72
The court stated that a child of fourteen years or more may
rebut the preference by stating his or her own preference .3 It also
held that a single act of sexual misconduct by the mother would
have to "be so outrageous that reasonable men [could] not differ
about its deleterious affect [sic] upon the child."
'74
Thus, the stage was set for Garska and its progeny.7 5
III. CHILD CUSTODY IN OTHER STATES
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may have been
sanguine about the constitutional questions raised by the maternal
preference,7 6 but this was certainly not true elsewhere in the nation.
Beginning in the early 1970's, the gender-based preference was be-
ing subjected to a growing tide of scholarly criticism.77 In 1972,
72. Id. at 336-39, 242 S.E.2d at 252-53.
73. Id. at 339-40, 242 S.E.2d at 253-54.
74. Id. at 345, 242 S.E.2d at 256.
75. Intervening were several relatively minor decisions. In Horton v. Horton, 164 W. Va. 358,
264 S.E.2d 160 (1980), the court affirmed a refusal to change custody to the husband because he
failed to demonstrate that it would materially benefit the children. In Acord v. Acord, 164 W. Va.
562, 264 S.E.2d 848 (1980), the court held that there must be a hearing before a court changes custody.
In Levine v. Levine, 165 W. Va. 327, 270 S.E.2d 137 (1980), the court held that custody could not
be changed based on mere conclusory allegations in the petition. Finally, in Leach v. Bright, 165 W.
Va. 636, 270 S.E.2d 793 (1980), the court changed custody to the mother after the custodial father
had relinquished custody to the paternal grandparents. None of these cases altered significantly the
existing law of custody in West Virginia.
76. J. B. v. A. B., 151 W. Va. at 235-39, 242 S.E.2d at 251-53.
77. Foster and Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FA.i. L.Q. 321 (1978); Podell, Peck & First,
supra note 1; Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 5 J. F.Am. L. 423
(1976-77); Note, Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Cases Held In Constitutional Gender-
Based Discrimination, 12 Cutt. L. REv. 513 (1981-82); Note, Child Custody, Preference to the Mother,
34 LA. L. REv. 881 (1974); Note, Child Custody - Rebutting the Presumption of Parental Preference,
43 Miss. L.J. 247 (1972); Note, Examining Oklahoma's Maternal Preference Doctrine: Gordon v.
Gordon, 13 TULSA L.J. 802 (1978); Comment, Male Parent v. Female Parent: Separate and Unequal
Rights, supra note 1.
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the United States Supreme Court ruled that an Illinois law which
presumed that the fathers of illegitimate children were unfit to raise
them violated the equal protection clause. 78 Subsequently, the ma-
ternal preference for custody of children of tender years, which
had been adopted in most states, 79 came under increasingly critical
scrutiny.80
Two courts finally declared the maternal preference to be un-
constitutional gender-based discrimination, 8 finding no rational ba-
sis for using it to support the legitimate state interest in protecting
children of tender years.82 This also caused twenty-one states to abol-
ish the tender years presumption.83
78. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
79. See McLellan v. McLellan, 220 Ala. 376, 125 So. 225 (1929); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 370 P.2d
902 (Alaska 1962); McFadden v. McFadden, 22 Ariz. 246, 196 P. 452 (1921); Disheroon v. Disheroon,
211 Ark. 519, 201 S.W.2d 17 (1947); Averch v. Averch, 104 Colo. 365, 90 P.2d 962 (1939); L'Marian
v. L'Marian, 14 Conn, Supp. 306 (C.P. 1946); Dorsett v. Dorsett, 281 A,2d 290 (D.C. 1971); Doane
v. Doane, 330 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1976); Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 81 P.2d 1081
(1938); Nye V. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952); Voy v. Voy, 241 Iowa 673, 41 N.W.2d 869
(1950); Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377, 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Harmon v, Harmon, 264 Ky. 315, 94
S.W.2d 670 (1936); Malone v. Malone, 271 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct, App. 1972); Hild v. Hld, 221 Md.
349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); Eisel v. Eisel, 261 Minn. 1, 110 N.W.2d 881 (1961); Brown v, Brown,
237 Miss. 83, 112 So. 2d 556 (1959); Wells v. Wells, 117 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Trudgen
v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225 (1958); Adams v. Adams, 86 Nev. 62, 464 P.2d 458 (1970);
Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 143 A.2d 874 (1958); Garner v. Stone, 85 N.M. 716, 516
P.2d 687 (1973); Weiss v. Weiss, 53 Misc. 2d 262, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Riggs v. Riggs,
124 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1954); Morrison v. Morrison, 197 Okla. 620, 173 P.2d 919 (1946); In re Carlisle,
225 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973); L'oebenburg v. Loebenburg, 85 R.I. 115, 127 A.2d 500
(1956); Powell v. Powell, 231 S.C. 283, 98 S.E.2d 764 (1957); Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 177
N.W.2d 267 (1970); Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W.987 (1918); Erwin v. Erwin, 505
S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975); Mullen v. Mullen, 188
Va, 259, 49 S.E.2d 349 (1948); Prothero v. Prothero, 137 Wash. 349, 242 P. 1 (1926); Funkhouser
v. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975); Farwell v. Farwell, 33 Wis. 2d 324, 147
N.W.2d 289 (1967); Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923 (Vyo. 1961). One author has reported that
nationwide, courts gave custody of minor children to mothers in 95% of all cases. Jones, The Tender
Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J. F m. LAW 695, 696 (1977-78).
80. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57. Justice White noted that while "[p]rocedure by presumption
is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination[s]," such a procedure "needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child," and therefore cannot stand.
Id.
81. Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d
178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
82. The Devine court held that creating a presumption of fitness for only one gender without
any consideration of the actual capabilities of the parties violated the equal protection clause. Devine,
398 So. 2d at 695-96. The Watts court found that "in addition to its other faults, [the tender years
presumption] works an unconstitutional discrimination against the [father]." Watts, 77 Misc. 2d at
183, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
83. See Jones, supra note 79, at 524 n.74.
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As the line of gender-based discrimination cases from the United
States Supreme Court84 and the scholarly criticism continued una-
bated,"5 it must have become increasingly clear to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals that the gender-based standard approved
of in J. B. v. A. B.16 would continue to come under such criticism,
as well as legal and legislative challenge, until a gender-neutral stan-
dard was adopted. This led, eventually, to the court's decision in
Garska v. McCoyY
IV. THE GARsKA DECISION
A. The Holding
The case arose when the trial court awarded custody of a child
born out of wedlock to the putative father. The mother appealed,88
and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took the oppor-
tunity to enunciate a new, gender-neutral standard for determining
custody disputes: the "primary caretaker" presumption.
8 9
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court responded to the West Vir-
ginia Legislature's adoption of Chapter 48, Article 2, Section 1 of
the West Virginia Code in 1980 which purported to mandate the
application of gender-neutral principles to child custody determi-
84. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (struck down the Idaho statute giving men preference
over women in the administration of decedent's estates); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(struck down a federal statute which presumed wives, but not husbands, of armed service personnel
to be dependent and entitled to certain benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (struck down an
Alabama statute that allowed wives, but not husbands, to receive alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (struck down an Oklahoma statute that allowed women, but not men, to buy 3.2% beer
at age 18); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (struck down a New York statute permitting
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to prevent the adoption of the child).
85. See, e.g., Comment, The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin Custody Cases,
supra note 2; Family Law: Natural Parent Preference or the Child's Best Interest, 12 UCLA-Ai.AsrA
L. REv. 141 (1982-83); "Best Interest" and "Material Change" Factors in Child Custody and Vis-
itation Modification Suits, supra note 2; Digest, Child Custody: Determining the Best Interest of the
Child, supra note 2.
86. 161 W. Va. at 333, 242 S.E.2d at 250.
87. 167 W. Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
88. There is uncharacteristic confusion regarding the style of this case. See id. at 59 n.1, 278
S.E.2d at 357 n.1. In any event, both the trial court and the appellate court treated this as essentially
a custody dispute between the child's natural parents.
89. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 68, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
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nation. 90 This legislative enactment had been prompted by strong
criticism of the court's earlier decision in J. B. v. A. B.91 and the
Garska case had been litigated and decided in the trial court on the
theory that the gender-neutral amendment had superseded the gen-
der-based standard approved by the court in J. B. v. A. B. 92
In adopting the primary caretaker presumption, the court made
it clear that it was promulgating a standard which met the gender-
neutral requirements of the legislative provision and, at the same
time, reached basically the same result as would have been reached
under the standard approved in J. B. v. A. B.. In other words, in
the vast majority of custody cases, the mother would retain custody.
What, then, was the advantage of the new standard? 93
The answer to that question is two-fold. First, the court wished
to make certain that, in the proper instance, a father who had, in
fact, been the primary caretaker, would receive custody if he were
fit. 94 Secondly, and certainly most importantly, the court wished to
90. The 1980 amendment read, in relevant part:
In making any such order respecting custody of minor children, there shall be no legal
presumption that, as between the natural parents, either the father or the mother should
be awarded custody of said children, but the Court shall make an award of custody solely
for the best interest of the children based upon the merits.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (repl. vol. 1986).
91. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 64-66, 278 S.E.2d at 360.
92. Id.
93. In David M. v. Margaret M., Justice Neely provides us with further scholarly underpinnings
and support for placing the child with the primary caretaker:
At the earliest stage, [the attachment to a primary caretaker] is critical to the child's learning
to place trust in others and to have confidence in her own capacities. Later, it plays a
central role in the child's capacity to establish emotional bonds with other persons. The
sense of trust in others and in self that the attachment provides may also affect the child's
development of intellectual and social skills. The growing child passes through many de-
velopmental stages, each requiring her to acquire critical skills and capacities .... The
original bond of the child with the primary caretaker is believed to have an important
continuing effect on the child's ability to pass through each stage with success.
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916 (XV. Va. 1989) (citing Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. R1v. 477, 530 (1984)). See also J.
GoLDsTn, A. FItrED AN A. So'Tirr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHMD, 31-35 (1979); Wexler,
Rethinking the Modification Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 799 (1985); Leonard & Prov-
ence, The Development of Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychological Parent, 53 CONN. B.J.
320, 326 (1979)).
94. This, of course, might have occurred under a J.B. v. A.B. type of analysis since the court
there held that the failure of the mother to provide the children with emotional support, routine
cleanliness, or nourishing food would rebut the maternal preference. J.B. v. A.B., 161 W. Va. at
339, 242 S.E.2d at 253.
[Vol. 92
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provide courts, lawyers and litigants with some degree of certainty
in making custody determinations. 95
B. The Rationale
The opinion itself is very critical of the fact that husbands often
used the threat of protracted and emotionally damaging custody
battles to extract monetary concessions from their wives in divorce
settlements.96 While the court was able to cite very little "hard ev-
idence" to support this proposition, 97 the author of the opinion,
Justice Neely, went on to author a law review article and a book
dealing with the same issue. 98 In these works, Justice Neely marshals
anecdotes from his own career along with some more impressive
statistics regarding the economics of being a woman in contemporary
America to support his premise in Garska.
Justice Neely, in the opinion99 and especially in his article, 1' ° ar-
ticulates a strong antipathy to determining custody through "trial
by expert." This he states is expensive, intellectually dishonest and
emotionally destructive of the very children we are purporting to
protect.10'
For these reasons, the court thought that the primary caretaker
rule, by its very simplicity, would provide courts with a simple test
for determining custody. It would also allow lawyers to reassure
95. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 68, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 68 n.7, 278 S.E.2d at 362 n.7. The court notes that the only evidence is supporting
this proposition is an anecdotal interview with an assistant court clerk and a Note in the Yale Law
Journal based on similar speculation. In a recent opinion, although discussing the entire rationale of
the primary caretaker doctrine, Justice Neely can still provide no scientific or statistical support for
this proposition. In fact, he candidly admits that the adoption of mandatory guidelines for setting
child support along with strengthened means of collecting that support tends to undercut one of the
primary reasons for the doctrine. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d at 921-22.
98. Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3
YALE L. AN PoL'Y REv. 168 (1984); NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISONS, 50 (McGraw Hill 1984) (es-
sentially restating the law review article). In David M. v. Margaret M., much of these two works is
adopted verbatim.
99. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 67, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
100. 'Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed,
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female primary caretakers that they were certain to gain custody,
and thus had no reason to bargain away important economic benefits
for themselves and their children. As a final bonus, it would provide
for shorter, more economical, less acrimonious divorce and custody




The primary caretaker doctrine, which holds that the parent who
has taken primary responsibility for taking care of the child's phys-
ical, social and educational needs will be given custody, if fit, set
the stage for future custody battles. Since there was generally no
question regarding who had been primarily responsible for taking
care of these needs for the child, the non-primary parent had only
the elusive "fitness" question to litigate. Time alone would tell
whether the court was willing to apply this strict rule on various
fitness issues in order to uphold the rationale of the primary care-
taker doctrine.
In the meantime, other States began to consider and adopt the
primary caretaker presumption. We turn next to their experience
with the doctrine.
V. THE PRIMARY CARETAKER DOCTRINE
A. Other States
When Garska was decided, only one other state supreme court
had considered the primary caretaker role when determining custody,
and then only when the evidence was "undisputed."' ' 03
102. Justice Neely later summarized the benefits as follows:
When properly applied, the primary caretaker parent presumption reduces sharp practices
in custody negotiation, prevents fathers and mothers from being penalized on account of
their gender, and avoids custody battles that are so unwieldy and intrusive that they make
the lives of a divorcing couple and their children even more miserable than they otherwise
would be.
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d at 915.
103. Oregon adopted the "primary caretaker" doctrine before West Virginia, as is evident from
[Vol. 92
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/3
19901 PRIMARY CARETAKER DOCTRINE
In the nine years since Garska, only six other states have con-
sidered the adoption of the primary caretaker presumption enun-
ciated therein.10 4 Of these, only Minnesota chose to adopt it.105
The states which considered and rejected the primary caretaker
presumption generally did so because they already had a gender-
neutral statute0 6 or court-ordered standard specifying the factors to
be considered when awarding custody. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court, citing Garska with approval, nevertheless held that the role
of the primary caretaker was entitled to only "positive considera-
tion" as a "substantial factor the trial judge must weigh in adju-
dicating a custody matter" and was neither presumptive nor
conclusive. 107
the following footnote in the Garska decision:
The Oregon Supreme Court has also relied upon a determination of the primary caretaker
parent in reaching custody decisions. That Court awarded custody to a mother when: "The
undisputed evidence in this case was that the wife was not merely the mother but was also
the primary parent. During the marriage she was not working and performed the traditional
and honorable role of homemaker. She cleaned the house, cared for the children, fed the
family, nursed them when sick and spent those countless hours disciplining, counseling and
chatting with the children that every homemaker should. For some families the husband
may perform this role and be the primary parent. In other families the parents evenly divide
the role and there is no primary parent. In this family the husband played the traditional
role of breadwinner, working eight to ten hours a day. In his off-hours he dedicated much
time and attention to the children, but the lion's share of the child raising was performed
by the wife. It is undisputed that the children were happy and well-adjusted and that the
relationship between the wife and children was close, loving and successful. Although the
same relationship unquestionably existed to a degree with the husband, the close and suc-
cessful emotional relationship between the primary parerit and the children coupled with
the age of the children dictate the continuance of that relationship."
Garska, 167 W. Va. at 69 n.10, 278 S.E.2d 363 n.10 (quoting Derby and Derby, 31 Or. App. 803,
806-7, 571 P.2d 562, 1080 (1977), modified on other grounds, 31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080
(1977), reh'g denied 281 Or. 323 (1978)).
104. In re Marriage of Grandinetti, 342 N.W,2d 876 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); Pikula v. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986); In re Maxwell,
8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (1982); Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d
1113 (Pa. Super. 1982); and Harris v. Harris, 546 A.2d 208 (Vt. 1988).
105. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712.
106. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1986); Cal. Civ. Code § 4608 (Vest 1983 &
Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (Vest 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (Burns 1986);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MD. FAId. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-2-3 (1984 &
Supp. 1986); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Callahan 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (Vest 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (1986); TEX. FAm. CODE
ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (Vest 1981).
107. Jordan, 448 A.2d at 1115.
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The Ohio Appeals Court, calling the Garska opinion "eloquent"
and quoting from it extensively, 08 nonetheless held that their custody
statute "would preclude our placing a presumptive quality on the
factor of who is the primary caretaker."' 9 The court emphasized,
however, that it was "a factor which must be given strong consid-
eration."" 0
The Iowa Court of Appeals also felt that the primary caretaker
role was an important factor in determining custody, but felt it was
precluded from adopting it as a conclusive presumption."'
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected making the primary
caretaker factor into a presumptive rule, stating that "in North Da-
kota the concept inheres in the statutory factors and has not yet
been accorded elevated status.""11 2
A later Ohio Appeals Court decision backed off even further
from adopting the primary caretaker analysis." 3 While recognizing
the analysis of a previous case discussing the doctrine," 4 the court
found "nothing magical about the words 'primary caregiver,"' and
warned trial courts against "the use of any rule as a 'substitute for
a searching factual analysis of the relative parental capabilities of
the parties.""' 5
The Vermont Supreme Court likewise rejected the primary care-
taker presumption,"16 stating that "such a presumption would be
inconsistent with the statutory scheme as it is presently written. ' " 7
108. Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d at 304-05, 456 N.E.2d at 1221-22.
109. Id. at 306, 456 N.E.2d at 1222.
110. Id.
111. Grandinetti, 342 N.W.2d at 878.
112. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622. It should be noted that there was a vigorous dissent in this
case, quoting extensively from Garska and applying much of Justice Neely's later analysis. Id. at
624-26.
113. Thompson v. Thompson, 31 Ohio App. 3d 254, 511 N.E.2d 412 (1987).
114. Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (1982).
115. Thompson, 511 N.E.2d at 415 (quoting Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981)).
This is, of course, the very thing that Garska sought to avoid.
116. Harris, 546 A.2d at 208.
117. Id. at 214. The court went on to elaborate that, "the statute requires the Court to 'consider'
each factor, a duty that would not be fulfilled in a case involving two 'fit' parents if custody were
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Justice Neely, in the recent West Virginia case of David M. v.
Margaret M., lists several other states which have discussed the no-
tion of primary caretaker in custody decisions. 1 8 None, however,
have gone on to adopt it.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court of Minnesota is the only
other state high court to adopt the primary caretaker presumption. 19
The court not only cited Garska with approval, and quoted from
it extensively, it specifically adopted "the indicia of primary par-
enthood set forth in Garska to aid trial courts in determining which,
if either [sic] parent is the primary caretaker."' 120 The analysis dis-
cussed in the opinion mirrors Justice Neely's realistic approach in
both Garska and his articles.
Because Minnesota has had an opportunity to test the various
legal issues raised by the primary caretaker presumption, it provides
us with the only other legal precedent which may help us to avoid
any legal or practical pitfalls inherent in the rule.
First of all, in adopting the doctrine, the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota recognized that the primary caretaker presumption will only
118. The following also have recognized the role of the primary caretaker as relevant to custody,
as illustrated in the David M. v. Margaret M. decision:
Smith v. Smith, 294 S.C. 194, 363 S.E.2d 404, 406 (S.C. App. 1987) (upholding custody
award to the primary caretaker who had custody of the children since the separation; "latter
factor alone supports the trial court's decision"); Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla.
1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 863 (reversing custody award to the father when the mother
was shown to be the primary caretaker); Burleigh v. Burleigh, 200 Mont. 1, 650 P.2d 753
(1982) (affirmed custody of two minor children with the mother based on evidence that she
was the primary person involved in their care, education and rearing); Leach v. Leach, 660
S.W.2d 761 (Mo. App. 1983) (Upholding custody award to the primary caretaker father
although contrary to the tender years presumption); Marlatt v. Marlatt, 427 So. 2d 1285
(La. App. 1983) (awarded custody to the father who was the primary 'nurturing parent').
Other Courts have implicitly considered the role of primary caretaker and have awarded
custody to the nurturing parent, or the parent who was responsible for the child. See In
re Marriage of Leopando, 106 IIl. App. 3d 444, 62 Ill. Dec. 340, 435 N.E.2d 1312, aff'd
96 I11. 2d 114, 70 Ill. Dec. 263, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983); Anderson v. Anderson, 121 Ariz.
405, 590 P.2d 944 (Ariz. App. 1979); Nale v. Nale, 409 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 1982)
(superseded by a presumption in favor of joint custody according to Lake v. Robertson,
452 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1983)).
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d at 926 (footnotes omitted).
119. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 705.
120. Id. at 713. It should be noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court was not deterred by the
fact that their legislature had adopted a statute specifically listing the factors to be considered by a
Court when awarding custody. See, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West 1984).
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apply to children of tender years who are too young to state a
preference for a particular parent. 121 This would seem to indicate
that a child old enough to express a parental preference and artic-
ulate a rational basis for it would rebut the primary caretaker pre-
sumption.
The intermediate Court of Appeals in Minnesota had occasion,
over the ensuing few years, to confront several of the issues raised
by the primary caretaker presumption. 22 In Jorschumb v. Jor-
schumb, 2 1 the court of appeals reviewed the first case to determine
that neither parent had been the child's primary parent. Here, the
father had been primarily responsible for the child's toilet training,
bedtime preparations and discipline, but had also often left the child
alone with the mother for long periods during which she took over
those duties. The court felt that the trial court's finding that neither
parent had been the child's primary caretaker at the time of sep-
aration was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the primary caretaker pre-
sumption was rebutted and the court returned to a "best interest
of the child" analysis. 124
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached an identical conclusion
in Regenscheid v. Regenscheid 25 There the court upheld a trial
court's finding that a mother providing the primary physical care
while the father provided the primary emotional and intellectual care
rebutted the primary caretaker presumption, 26 and required a return
to the traditional "best interest of the child" analysis.
The court of appeals has also ruled that a very strong case of
unfitness would have to be made in order to deny custody to the
primary caretaker. 127
121. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
122. In Kennedy v. Kennedy, 376 N.W,2d 702 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) the Court of Appeals
merely remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Pikula, which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had issued just four days earlier. The same result occurred in Ozenna v. Parmelee, 377 N.W.2d 483
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) decided just two weeks after Pikula.
123. 390 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
124. Id. at 812. This result was also recommended in Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713-14.
125. 395 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id. at 379.
127. Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court itself revisited the issue
in Sefkon v. Sefkon 21 and reversed a trial court that applied the
primary caretaker presumption in a hearing on a petition to modify
custody brought three years after the initial divorce. First, the court
held that the child was in the third grade and was thus old enough
to state a rational preference which would rebut the primary care-
taker presumption. 29 Next, the litigation had taken so long 30 that
the primary caretaker presumption no longer applied. Finally, the
court ruled that the determination of the primary caretaker for one
child was not conclusive as to who had been the primary caretaker
for another child of the same marriage.'
Thus in Minnesota several decisions mirror the results of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals when faced with similar
issues. 32 We also have a valuable source of legal analysis and prec-
edent for issues which have not yet been raised in West Virginia.
B. Scholarly Analysis
Late in 1985, the scholarly community began to analyze and react
to the primary caretaker doctrine. 33 Professor Cochran of Pepper-
dine University School of Law was very critical of the notion of
utilizing the primary caretaker role on a case-by-case basis as merely
one factor among many to be weighed in a custody decision. Citing,
among other things, Justice Neely's law review article, 34 Professor
Cochran basically accepts the argument put forward by Justice Neely
that a case-by-case approach not only increases the uncertainty of
the custody decision, it also necessarily decreases the bargaining power
128. 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988).
129. Id. at 212.
130. The couple separated in September, 1983; the trial court used this date in determining which
parent was the primary caretaker, although the child had been in her mother's sole custody for almost
three years when the trial court finally awarded custody in August, 1986. Id. at 205, 212.
131. Id. at 213.
132. See Section VI infra.
133. Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Di-
vorce,: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICIOND L. REv.
1 (1985).
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of the primary caretaker. 135 Thus, Professor Cochran dismissed this
approach in making rational custody decisions." 6
Professor Cochran looks with much greater favor on the primary
caretaker presumption enunciated in Garska:
A primary caretaker preference reduces some of the dangers that exist under the
case-by-case rule. For example, if there is a primary caretaker, under such a
preference, the parents will know that that parent will get custody unless the other
parent can overcome the preference. The dangers of the non-primary caretaker
threatening a custody fight in order to gain a bargaining advantage and of parental
conflict and litigation are reduced.'
37
However, while generally praising the Garska doctrine, Professor
Cochran is quite critical of the limitation of that decision to children
of tender years:
In Garska v. McCoy, the leading primary caretaker preference case, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals justified the primary caretaker preference
entirely on the basis of the need for a reliable rule, and yet the court limited the
applicability of the rule to children of tender years. The court cited as advantages
of a reliable rule that it discourages unfair bargaining and encourages settlement.
Both are worthwhile goals yet both are unrelated to the age of the child. As
children get older, the primary caretaker's ties to them are likely to continue to
be strong, leaving the primary caretaker open to the danger of custody litigation
threats if the primary caretaker preference expires. Parental conflict and litigation
do not become less of a danger as a child gets older. 38
Thus, Professor Cochran goes on to advocate a joint custody
presumption with physical custody to the primary caretaker and no
age limitation on the presumption.'3 9
The next law review article to advocate the issue was a student
note in the Minnesota Law Review which was extremely critical of
the Minnesota Supreme Court for adopting the primary caretaker
presumption. 40
135. And, as Justice Neely freely acknowledges, although it is a gender-neutral doctrine, the
primary caretaker presumption is normally spelled M-O-T-H-E-R.
136. Cochran, supra note 133, at 15.
137. Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
138. Id. at 63 (footnotes omitted).
139. Id. at 64.
140. Note, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a "Primary Caretaker"
Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1344 (1986).
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The first criticism is based on the legislative history of the Min-
nesota child custody statute. 141 The second criticism is more sub-
stantial. It is based on a claim that the primary caretaker presumption
overlooks several statutory factors which are important for the best
interest of the child. 142
Because it felt that stability for the child was the paramount
legislative concern, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly rejected
having trial courts consider other statutory factors such as the "cul-
tural factors" and "guidance potential." The court stated that, while
these factors are "plainly relevant to a child's wellbeing [sic] and
security," such factors are "inherently resistant of evaluation and
difficult to apply in any particular case.' 1 43
While acknowledging that these individualized custody deter-
minations are very difficult to make and had even been shown in
the past to have discriminated against both racial minorities and
women, 144 the author nevertheless argued for a return to a consid-
eration of all the statutory factors. 145 Other than the argument that
the court had no right to ignore portions of a legislative enactment,
the author presents no compelling theoretical arguments against the
primary caretaker presumption.
The final scholarly analysis of the primary caretaker doctrine was
done in a provocative article by Professor Marcia O'Kelly of the
North Dakota Law School faculty. 146 In the article, Professor O'Kelly
examines the major custody decisions of the North Dakota Supreme
Court 147 to determine if the primary caretaker preference would have
141. MINN. STAT. § 518.167(1) (1984). See Note, supra note 139, at 1347.
142. Note, supra note 140, at 1359.
143. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712.
144. Note, supra note 140, at 1364 n.95.
145. Id. The author attributed the acknowledged poor quality of "expert" evaluations in custody
cases to "inadequate training, overworked staff and insufficient funding" and hoped to solve those
problems in the future. But see Note, Is there Gender Neutrality in Minnesota Custody Disputes?,
9 HAIMINE L. REv. 411 (1986).
146. O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian,
63 N.D.L. Rv. 481 (1987) In spite of Professor O'Kelly's cogent analysis, the North Dakota Supreme
Court recently discussed, but rejected, her suggestion that North Dakota adopt the primary caretaker
presumption. VonBank v. VonBank, 443 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1989).
147. The reader will recall that the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the primary caretaker




O'Hanlon and Workman: Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: The Primary Caretaker Doct
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
resulted in a different outcome. Her ultimate conclusion is that the
results would have been the same except in two areas.
In the first area, it was clear that the sexual conduct of the
mother had an impact on North Dakota custody decisions, even
where there was no showing of a detrimental impact on the child.148
In the second area, she argues that the failure of the primary care-
taker doctrine to allow a showing that the non-primary parent was
the "psychological parent" to whom the child turned for emotional
support and nurturance, and to have this factor rebut the pre-
sumption, caused a different result in a North Dakota case. 49
Professor O'Kelly argues eloquently for the adoption of such a
"psychological parent" exception as well as for the primary care-
taker doctrine's ability to shield women from custodial decisions
based on morality having no impact on the children. 150
Thus, the bulk of persuasive scholarly opinion clearly favors the
primary caretaker presumption, with some useful changes, as a help-
ful rule in resolving custody disputes.151 We can turn now to the
West Virginia experience with the primary caretaker presumption.
VI. TrE WEST VIRGINIA EXPERIENCE WITH THE PRIMARY
CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
West Virginia has accumulated a great deal of jurisprudence in
the area of the primary caretaker doctrine, since we have applied
it longer than any other state. The cases fall into nine different
categories and, taken as a whole, form a rational scheme which
allows lawyers to advise their clients, and judges and family law
masters to predict whether a novel factual situation will fall within
148. O'Kelly, supra note 146, at 558.
149. Id. at 559.
150. Id. at 560. Even the Vermont Supreme Court while rejecting the presumption, noted that:
"To some degree, it will direct the evidence away from the spousal misconduct focus that too often
pervades custody hearing and onto the needs of the child." Harris v. Harris, 546 A.2d at 214 (Vt.
1988).
151. The reader is also directed to the discussion of cases in Annotation, Child's Wishes as
Factoring Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.3d 1346 (1965); and the particularly thorough discussion found
in Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor In Awarding Custody of
Child, 41 A.L.R. 4th 1129 (1988).
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or without the primary caretaker presumption. Let us now turn to
the various cases and their categories.
A. Failure to Find Primary Caretaker
The first wave of custody cases to reach the court after Garska
predictably involved the failure of trial court judges to make findings
regarding the primary caretaker. This, of course, prevented the ap-
pellate court from making an informed review of whether the cus-
todial arrangement ordered by the lower court comported with the
requirements of Garska.152 Three cases were remanded with
instruction'53 regarding the primary caretaker issue and four were
remanded for further findings of fact and law.
154
B. Sexual Conduct or Misconduct as Affecting Fitness
The court was then faced with the inevitable fitness issues, the
only real battleground left to a non-primary parent after Garska.
It must have been clear to the court that, should it establish a liberal
standard for determining that the primary caretaker was unfit, and
thus not entitled to custody, that one of the important theoretical
underpinnings of the primary caretaker doctrine 155 would be seriously
undetermined. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals thus
consistently refused to deny custody to primary caretakers as a result
of their sexual conduct or misconduct, so long as the misconduct
did not involve the children and was not so aggravated as to violate
contemporary moral standards.
156
152. Burger v. Burger, 350 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1986); Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E,2d 112 (W. Va.
1984); Bills v. Bills, 296 S.E.2d 348 (W. Va. 1982); and Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d 680 (W.
Va. 1982).
153. In Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296 S.E.2d 686 (,V. Va. 1982), Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d
158 (W. Va. 1983), and Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1983), the court had enough
evidence in the record to determine that the mother had been the undisputed primary caretaker. In
all of these cases, the court remanded with instruction to award custody.
154. Bego v. Bego, 350 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1986); Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778 (XV. Va.
1986); Witte v. Witte, 315 S.E.2d 246 (XV. Va. 1984); Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va.
1984).
155. That being the certainty that, if you were the primary caretaker, you would receive custody
and would not have to negotiate away important economic benefits for yourself and your child in
order to ensure custody.
156. It should be noted that the court has taken the same hard line against finding unfitness
for non-sexual misconduct, in this case, marijuana use. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d at 680.
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The court reversed and remanded a trial court's denial of custody
to a mother because of an incident of adultery. 15 7 The court went
on to overrule a trial court's refusal to award custody to a primary
caretaker because an ongoing adulterous relationship rendered her
unfit. 58 Next, the court reversed the denial of custody to a primary
caretaker because the trial court found the "moral atmosphere" in
her home rendered her unfit. 15 9 The same result was reached in a
case where the primary caretaker's sexual misconduct was found by
the court to have not been "egregious" and not to have been shown
to have affected the child adversely.l 6° Finally, the court again re-
versed the trial court's denial of custody to the primary caretaker
because she had "abused and neglected" the children, thus rendering
her unfit.
161
Thus the court consistently sought to avoid undercutting the Gar-
ska rationale. 162 In the following areas, however, they were faced
with even more difficult theoretical questions.
157. Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985). The court here applied the standard of J.B.
v. A.B., 161 W. Va. 332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978), which held that acts of misconduct cannot be
considered as evidence of unfitness unless it is so aggravated, given contemporary moral standards,
that reasonable people would consider her immoral and unfit to raise children. There, a mother's
single act of fellatio on a third party in a dark parking lot was insufficient.
158. Bickler v. Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986). It should be noted, however, that Justice
Brotherton filed a dissent, joined in by Justice McHugh, in which he argued that the court had
adopted a moral standard that might well harm the child. Id. at 633. The court, however, has recently
unanimously reversed a trial court which found a primary caretaker unfit due to two acts of adultery
over a two year period. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 927-28 (V. Va. 1989).
159. M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987). Here, the mother was alleged to be
having an affair with a man who had previously been a homosexual.
160. Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987). This was another case involving a mother
who had been guilty of an act of adultery prior to the separation.
161. Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d, 782 (W. Va. 1988). In this case, the children were exposed
to their mother's boyfriend in his underwear, and also sleeping in a non-sexual manner in the same
bed as their mother at a motel while on a trip. There was no evidence that this adversely affected
the children in any way. The mother later married this man.
162. It should be noted that, in Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1985), the court
reversed a change of custody by the trial court where the primary caretaker had violated a court
order preventing her from seeing a reputed lesbian friend and from traveling outside the state with
the children. It should also be noted that the visitation rights of a non-custodial spouse cannot be
diminished because of misconduct, including failure to pay child support, unless it can be demonstrated
that the misconduct affects the welfare of the child. Ledsome v. Ledsome, 301 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va.
1983). It was also held insufficient to change custody because of visitation problems. Kinney v. Kinney,
304 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1983). Finally, it should be acknowledged that the court has applied the
same standard for petitions to modify custody. In Legg v. Legg, 169 W. Va. 753, 289 S.E.2d 504
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C. Primary Caretaker and the Petition to Modify
The traditional rule in West Virginia, in petitions to modify, has
always been that there must have been a material change of cir-
cumstances since the last custody order, and that the petitioner must
demonstrate that a change of custody would be in the material best
interest of the child. 163
The court, after Garska, was faced with the issue of how the
primary caretaker presumption impacted upon a petition to modify
custody. Since the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine' 64 did
not apply to a petition to modify, the court in Garska itself, and
in every case that has followed, has held that the primary caretaker
doctrine has no application in a petition to modify custody.
65
D. Custodial Parent Voluntarily Relinquishes Custody
Temporarily
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, perhaps because
of a long cultural tradition of large, extended families in the State,
has had many occasions to rule on situations where the custodial
(1982), the court reversed a lower court for changing custody due to the mother's sexual indiscretions.
The court ruled that these did not make her unfit under a J. B. v. A. B. analysis and thus did not
constitute a material change of circumstances.
163. Horton v. Horton, 164 W. Va. 353, 264 S.E.2d 160 (1980); Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W. Va.
45, 239 S.E.2d 669 (1977); Holstein v. Holstein, 152 W. Va. 119, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1968). The court
has held that a permanent relationship or regular overnight visitor is a sufficient change of circumstance
to justify a re-examination of custody, but that remarriage is not per se presumptive against continued
custody. S.H. v. R.L.H., 169 W. Va. 550, 289 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1982). Accord Porter v. Porter,
298 S.E.2d 130 (V. Va. 1982).
164. That is, that certainty of custody before a final divorce hearing prevents primary parents
from negotiating away important economic benefits for themselves and their children to ensure cus-
tody.
165. See Garska v. McCoy, 167 W. Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981); Porter v. Porter, 298 S.E.2d
130 (WV. Va. 1982); S.L.M. v. J.M., 321 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 1984); Thomas v. Thomas, 327 S.E.2d
149 (W. Va. 1985); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1985); Tucker v. Tucker, 341 S.E.2d
700 (NV. Va. 1986); Weece v. Cottle, 352 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1986). The court has taken a strong
stand on the issue of child abuses as a basis for modifying custody. In S.L.M. v. J.M., a mother
lost custody for concealing the child from visitation and failing to protect the child from sexual abuse
while in her care. In Thomas, the court upheld a modification of custody based on evidence that the
custodial mother's boyfriend had been involved with child abuse and drugs.
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parent has voluntarily relinquished temporary custody to a third
party, 166 then later sought to regain that custody. 67
The court has, since Garska, consistently ruled that the primary
caretaker presumption does not apply in such circumstances, and
that the same standard will apply as in a petition to change cus-
tody, t6
8
There must, in these cases, be a showing that the child's custodial
parent intended to relinquish custody. 6 9 And the person to whom
custody was voluntarily relinquished may be the non-custodial
spouse. 70 The child's current custodian has standing to intervene in
an abuse and neglect proceeding to terminate the natural parents'
rights. 171 A father having temporary custody of children while their
custodial mother was hospitalized for a mastoidectomy was entitled
to require the mother to prove it would be in the children's material
best interest to return to her custody. 72 Where there is substantial
evidence that the custodial mother relinquished custody to the pa-
ternal grandparents, she would be required to show that it would
be in their material best interest in order to regain custody. 7  The
trial court's award of temporary custody to the child's paternal aunt
and uncle was upheld where the evidence demonstrated a history of
long voluntary absences by the mother and previous attempts by
her to relinquish custody of her son.174 Where the primary caretaker
166. Often a family member, usually a grandparent of the child.
167. See, e.g., Odalsek v. Odalsek, 98 W. Va. 357, 127 S.E. 59 (1925); State ex rel. Palmer v.
Postlethwaite, 106 W. Va. 838, 145 S.E. 738 (1928); Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116
S.E.2d 691 (1960); and, perhaps the strangest case in this line, Blake v. Blake, 310 S.E.2d 207 (W.
Va. 1983) where the grandparents, having previously been granted custody, divorced each other and
fought a bitter custody battle over their grandchildren (the grandfather won!).
168. That is, that the change of custody would be in the material best interest of the child. See
infra Section VI-C.
169. Ford v. Ford, 303 S.E.2d 253 (,V. Va. 1983).
170. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230 (,V. Va. 1985). Intent to relinquish must be shown
even, as here, where the relinquishment was caused by the father's failure to provide support money.
171. Bowens v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1984).
172. Rozas v. Rozas, 342 S.E.2d 201 (V. Va. 1986). In fairness, it should be pointed out that
the father presented evidence that the child had been physically abused while in the mother's custody.
173. In re Custody of Cotrill, 346 S.E.2d 47 (V. Va. 1986). Here the mother had failed to
provide any support and had only rarely visited the children during the seven years they resided with
their grandparents, although she was always welcome when she did visit,
174. In re Livesay, 364 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1987).
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custodial mother indicated in writing her intent to voluntarily re-
linquish custody temporarily to their father, the presumption is re-
butted and the trial court may consider the child's best interest in
awarding custody.'
7
E. Voluntarily Relinquished Permanent Custody
The line of cases that has given the court the most difficulty has
been the attempted revocation of an adoption, where there has been
a strong bonding between the young child and the new custodians.
These are similar to the cases discussed previously regarding tem-
porary relinquishment of custody, but involve the additional issue
of the termination of parental rights.
In the two cases thus far decided, the court has recognized the
best interests of the child may outweigh the rights of the child's
natural parent, but have not applied a primary caretaker presump-
tion.
In West Virginia Dept. of Human Services v. La Rea Ann C.L. ,'176
the court ruled that although a minor had an absolute statutory
right to revoke a consent to adoption at any time before the final
order was signed,' 77 where a substantial period of time had elapsed,
that right would be moderated by the child's best interests. In the
celebrated case of Lemley v. Barr,178 the court determined that where
a consent to adoption was technically deficient, 79 and a long period
of time had passed with the child in the custody of the adoptive
family, the child's custody should not be disturbed unless there was
"a clear showing of significant benefit to him."' 80
F. Both Parents Equally Primary Caretakers
Just as the Minnesota Court of Appeals had confronted in Jor-
schumb v. Jorschumb,'8 ' the issue of what to do when neither parent
175. Mills v, Gorrick, 381 S.E.2d 273 (XV. Va. 1989).
176. 332 S.E.2d 632 (W, Va. 1985).
177. W. VA. CODE § 49-3-1(a) (1977, 1984) and W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(a) (1965) (currently W.
VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a) (1984)).
178. 343 S.E.2d 101 (,V. Va. 1986).
179. The consent was deficient since it was notarized by a notary from an adjoining state where
the birth mother resided.
180. Lemley, 343 S.E.2d at 102-03.
181. 390 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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was clearly the primary caretaker, 82 or when both parents were
equally the primary caretaker,'83 finally arose in West Virginia. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, having already addressed
the theoretical possibility in Garska itself, did the same thing the
Minnesota Courts had done: the court found the primary caretaker
presumption to have been rebutted'84 and looked to the child's best
interest.185
G. Both Parents Unfit
In Collins v. Collins,86 the court upheld a finding that the mother,
although the primary caretaker, was unfit because of her neglect of
the children. The father being found equally unfit to care for chil-
dren, the court upheld an award of custody to the grandparents.
H. Child Under Fourteen States a Preference
The court has also had to face the question of what effect a
stated preference by the child will have on the primary caretaker
presumption. It first faced the issue in Graham v. Graham,'87 where
the trial court had found both parents to have taken equal primary
responsibility for raising the child. There, with the presumption re-
butted, the six-year old child's stated preference was found to be
a proper basis for awarding custody to the father. 18
182. In Wagoner v. Wagoner, 310 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1983), the court held that evidence of
who primarily cared for the children when the whole family was together was entitled to more weight
than what either spouse did when alone with the children. Nevertheless, the fact that the father
occasionally hired a babysitter for the children when he had physical care of them was a basis for
denying him custody.
183. See Regenscheid, 395 N.W.2d at 375. This also occurred in Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d
189 (W. Va. 1984) (Justice Miller and Justice McGraw dissenting).
. 184. See T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984). The lower court was upheld after
finding both parents to have been equally primary caretakers. The court then awarded custody to
the father, finding that the mother frequently left the child alone to go smoke marijuana with a
neighbor. This the court held to not be in the child's best interest.
185. J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1984). The court held that where the primary
caretaker was disabled at the time of the final divorce hearing, the court should give temporary custody
to the other parent and, when the disability ended, hold a de novo hearing on custody using the
"best interest of the child" standard. Id. at 72.
186. 297 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).
187. 326 S.E.2d 189 (V. Va. 1984).
188. Id. at 191.
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The court next held that the voluntary, intelligently-expressed
preference of a ten-year old child for the non-primary parent rebuts
the presumption and requires the trial court to consider the child's
best interest. 18 9 It should be noted here, however, that the stated
preference of a child under fourteen for a change in custody has
been held not to constitute a sufficient change of circumstances,
standing alone, to justify a modification of custody. 190
Finally, the court faced a situation where the mother had moved
out of the home and the father had been the children's primary
caretaker for the two years preceding the divorce. The older child
refused to state a preference. The younger child expressed a pref-
erence to live with his mother. This was held to rebut the pre-
sumption and both children were awarded to the wife. 191
L Child Over Fourteen States a Preference
Because West Virginia had a statute allowing a child of fourteen
or older to nominate his or her own guardian, 92 the court in Garska
recognized that the concept of a child of "tender years" would have
to end at that age, and the primary caretaker presumption would
not apply. 193 Thus, it came as no surprise when the court held that
a child of fourteen has an absolute right to state a preference for
189. Rose v. Rose, 340 S.E.2d 176 (V. Va. 1986). This case also allows for an in camera interview
with the child, on the record, but outside the presence of the parties or their counsel. This exception
to the primary caretaker presumption is perhaps the most dangerous and the one most likely to be
abused. Justice Neely certainly seems to understand this when he writes in David M. v. Margaret
M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 920 (f. Va. 1989) (footnotes omitted):
Children over the age of six might seem to be the best available experts on the subject of
how the parents and children get along. Usually, however, children do not want what is
best for them; they want what is pleasant. If children are permitted to influence decisions
about custody simply by stating a preference, the parents are placed in the position of being
competitive bidders in a counterfeit currency. For the children the results are seldom positive.
Strangely, however, in a case replete with citation, he fails to reconcile this excellent critique with
the current case law in West Virginia. He does, however, without citing either Rose, or T.S.K. v.
K.B.K., 371 S.E.2d 362 (f. Va. 1988), state that the trial court should only solicit the child's pref-
erence "in exceptional cases when the trial judge is unsure about the wisdom of awarding the children
to the primary caretaker." David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d at 924.
190. Shimp v. Shimp, 366 S.E.2d 663 (V. Va. 1988).
191. T.S.K. v. K.B.K., 371 S.E.2d at 366.
192. W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1923).
193. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 70, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
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a custodial parent. 14 The primary caretaker presumption would not
apply and the preferred parent, if fit, must be given custody.,"
VII. CONCLUSION
From a review of the foregoing, it should be apparent that the
primary caretaker presumption is still alive and well in West Vir-
ginia, that it has worked well in other states, and that it has survived
scholarly scrutiny. Like the famous quote about democracy, it is
the worst system for determining custody ... except for all the
others!
The exceptions to the primary caretaker rule are both rational
and valuable. They include petitions to modify, situations where the
custodial parent voluntarily relinquishes custody (permanently or
temporarily), and situations where children old enough to voluntarily
state an intelligent preference do so.
It is suggested that an additional exception be considered, such
as the one recommended by Professor O'Kelly, 9 6 when the non-
primary parent is, in fact, the psychological parent to whom the
child turns for emotional support. It is also suggested, since the
court's recent restriction of joint custody arrangements, 197 that Pro-
fessor Cochran's idea of joint custody with physical custody to the
primary caretaker is not something that would be likely to add much
to a trial court or practicing attorney's consideration of custody
issues in this jurisdiction. 98
194. Justice Neely recently summed up the rational basis for the three categories of children:
In the child custody context, children fall into one of three groups, depending on their age.
Children under six years of age are called 'children of tender years': they are the most
dependent on their parents, but they usually cannot articulate an intelligent opinion about
their custody. Children between six and fourteen are also dependent on their parents, but
they can usually articulate a preference regarding custody arrangements and explain their
reasons. By the age of fourteen a child takes on many of the qualities of an adult; in most
cases, unless geography interferes, a child over fourteen will decide for himself or herself
the parent with whom he or she wants to live, regardless of what a Court says,
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d at 912-20.
195. In re M.D., 298 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va. 1982); Busch v. Busch, 304 S.E.2d 683 (W. Va. 1983).
196. O'Kelly, supra note 146.
197. Lowe v. Lowe, 370 S.E.2d 731 (,V. Va. 1988).
198. Cochran, supra note 133. It should be noted that one impediment to this proposal is the
court's recent ruling that joint custody could only be considered in cases where both parties consent
to it. Michael R. v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840 (f. Va. 1989). See also, David M. v. Margaret M.,
385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989).
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The authors hope that this review will provide the reader with
a comprehensive overview of the history of child custody jurispru-
dence in West Virginia; an appreciation of the current status of the
primary caretaker preference in our state, other states, and in the
literature; a rational basis for categorizing the exceptions to the pri-
mary caretaker doctrine; and, finally, some useful ideas from other
states' jurisprudence as well as from scholarly research for further
areas in which the doctrine might be modified or improved.
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